Bargaining with the bomb: Militarized nuclear signals and crisis bargaining

When and how do nuclear weapons help states achieve political aims during crisis bargaining? To answer this question, Kyungwon Suh presents a military signaling theory of crisis management with nuclear weapons, which focuses on what is called a militarized nuclear signal—a military action a state takes with its nuclear-capable forces during crisis bargaining. The theory argues that militarized nuclear signals affect states’ achievement of bargaining aims by increasing the risk and expected outcome of nuclear escalation, which in turn affects targets’ preferred course of action.

However, such effects are not uniform across cases. Specifically, militarized nuclear signals interact with three other factors: targets’ nuclear possession, the balance of nuclear forces, and the balance of conventional military forces. With a new dataset on all instances of militarized nuclear signals in interstate crises from 1945 to 2002, Suh tests his hypotheses quantitatively. The results largely support the theory: intra-crisis behavior using nuclear forces helps to achieve crisis bargaining aims when facing conventionally powerful non-nuclear opponents. However, nuclear signals in crises do not create a measurable effect on crisis outcomes if the balance of conventional forces favors the coercer. In addition, military actions with nuclear-capable forces in crises hurt bargaining leverage when opponents possess nuclear weapons and the nuclear balance of power favors opponents